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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - You CAN'T TAKE IT WITH YOU: 
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION RULES 
BASED ON RESIDENCY 
INTRODUCTION 
Imagine the following scenario: Alice Doe is a blue-collar 
worker in the fictional state of Utopia, performing specialized tasks 
in a factory for average wages. She was born and raised in the state, 
but her children have moved away to Pennsylvania to find better 
jobs and to live closer to their spouses' families. One day at work, a 
freak accident occurs, and Alice loses three fingers on her right 
hand. She is no longer able to perform her job, but she is eligible 
for workers' compensation benefits. Alice is confident she will be 
able to maintain her modest lifestyle because Utopia's workers' 
compensation system is known to give fair and adequate benefits. 
According to Utopia's benefits schedule, Alice receives sixty­
six percent of her former salary for twenty-five weeks as compensa­
tion for the loss of her fingers. Forty-eight additional weekly pay­
ments will make up for her lost earning potential. However, six 
months after her injury, she has yet to find a suitable job, and she is 
concerned about doing simple household chores with her injury, 
such as shoveling snow. Alice's son convinces her to move to Penn­
sylvania, where her children can assist her with daily life and where 
skilled jobs that Alice can perform are plentiful. 
Not long after Alice moves to Pittsburgh, she is notified by the 
state of Utopia that she is no longer eligible to receive workers' 
compensation payments. The state's Workers' Compensation Act 
requires those receiving loss of earning potential payments to be 
residents of Utopia. Alice checks with the Pennsylvania Workers' 
Compensation board to see if its rules would allow her to continue 
receiving benefits, but the Pennsylvania statute only applies to 
workers who are injured while working in Pennsylvania or for a 
Pennsylvania corporation. She checks with a Utopia attorney, and 
she tells Alice that the highest court in Utopia has upheld the stat­
ute. Alice is shocked. She is disabled due to a work accident that 
occurred in Utopia, and she will never be able to earn her former 
salary; yet she cannot receive any of the benefits she was formerly 
entitled to because she decided to move to another state. Further­
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more, her attorney informs her that she cannot sue her former em­
ployer for the injury because the Utopia Workers' Compensation 
Act precludes suits for covered injuries. l 
At present, most states do not treat residents and non-residents 
receiving workers' compensation benefits differently. However, a 
few states have adopted workers' compensation laws that allow for 
such disparate treatment.2 That number could increase as many 
states are currently experiencing a fiscal crisis.3 States may consider 
changing workers' compensation laws to encourage employers to 
relocate and to help strengthen the economy.4 This Note questions 
the constitutionality of workers' compensation systems that reduce 
or eliminate payments to recipients who, although otherwise eligi­
ble, are no longer residents of the state. Specifically, this Note will 
discuss whether such statutes infringe on the constitutional right to 
travel and should, therefore, be subject to the same strict scrutiny 
review as other statutes that penalize moving from state to state. 
This Note begins, in Part I, with a brief primer in workers' 
compensation law, including its history and current operation. 
Then, Part II gives a history of the right to travel and a discussion of 
the impact of recent cases relying on that right. Part III closely ex­
amines two cases that have evaluated workers' compensation laws 
1. See infra Part I.e. 
2. ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.175 (2002) (out-of-state resident's benefits calculated by 
multiplying the in-state compensation rate "by the ratio of the cost of living of the area 
in which the recipient resides to the cost of living in this state"); CONN. GEN. STAT. 
§ 31-308a (2003) (limiting additional benefits for partial permanent disability to those 
injured employees who remain "willing and able to perform work" in Connecticut); 
NEV. REV. STAT. 616C.455 (2002) (giving a 65% cost-of-living increase to residents of 
Nevada who receive compensation for injury that occurred before April 9, 1971). 
3. See, e.g., Patrick Crowley, N. Ky.'s Share of Pie in Doubt, CINCINNATI EN· 
QUIRER, Jan. 6, 2004, at 1C; Maryellen FilIo, Budget Has Many Seeing Red; Officials 
Upset as State Cuts Aid to 100 Municipalities, HARTFORD COURANT, Aug. 20, 2003, at 
B1; Scott S. Greenberger, Legislative Leaders OK $102M Plan Spending Bill Would 
Restore Some Cuts, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 13,2003, at B1; Jordan Rau, State of Uncer­
tainty; Pataki Agenda Faces a Wary Legislature, NEWSDAY, Jan. 7, 2004, at A15. 
4. For example, California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger called for "real 
workers' comp reform" during his 2004 state of the state address. Governor Arnold 
Schwarzenegger, California State of the State Address, Sacramento, Cal. (Jan. 6, 2004) 
(transcript available at http://www.governor.ca.gov!state!govsite!gov_homepage.jsp). 
This appeal was part of a list of ways to improve the business climate in California and 
to bring new jobs to the state. Id. Other states also see lower workers' compensation 
insurance rates as a way to attract new businesses. Charles Stein, Hoping to Mine Gold 
from the Golden State Romney, Other Governors See Chance to Woo Firms Away, Bos· 
TON GLOBE, Nov. 20, 2003, at C1. See also NEB. REv. STAT. § 48-1-118 (2004) (requir­
ing a biannual review of the current workers' compensation laws to determine 
effectiveness in "controll[ing] or reduc[ing] the cost of workers' compensation 
premiums"). 
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in terms of the right to travel. Finally, in Part IV, this Note argues 
that the current right to travel jurisprudence is not sufficiently 
broad to evaluate the constitutionality of all penalties on interstate 
movement. Specifically, it contends that the three components of 
the right articulated in Saenz v. Roe have been narrowly applied in 
the workers' compensation cases and as such, do not fully protect 
the right to free movement. Part IV also stresses that the current 
application of the law fails to further the goals of workers' compen­
sation and any attempts to treat workers' compensation like welfare 
should be abandoned. Finally, Part IV will argue that strict scrutiny 
review is the appropriate test to evaluate the constitutionality of 
any workers' compensation statute that takes benefits away from a 
recipient solely because they have changed their state of residence. 
I. WORKERS' COMPENSATION 
Workers' compensation is a broad, complex topic. This section 
will touch only on the areas that are critical to the discussion of the 
right to travel issue.s First, Part I.A explores the history of workers' 
compensation, explaining that it was created to allow workers to 
recover for on-the-job injuries in a predictable way from employers 
and to ensure that injured workers did not become burdens to the 
state. Part I.B attempts to clarify the nature of workers' compensa­
tion by contrasting it with tort recoveries and social insurance pro­
grams like welfare. Workers' compensation is further defined in 
Part I.C by a discussion of its quid pro quo characteristics, that an 
employee may collect from the employer without a finding of fault, 
but in return the employer is shielded from all lawsuits arising from 
the action. In other words, in exchange for a guaranteed remedy, 
the employee receives an exclusive remedy. Finally, Part I.D ex­
plains the role of state statutes in determining eligibility and bene­
fits. While an employee may be able to look to a number of state 
statutes for a determination of benefits, it is always the employer 
who pays, either directly or through its insurer. 
A. Historical Background and Underlying Purposes 
Before the nineteenth century, employers were never liable in 
tort for on-the-job injuries suffered by employees.6 Indeed, most 
5. For a more complete treatment of the topic, see LEX K. LARSON & ARTHUR 
LARSON, WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW; CASES, MATERIALS AND TEXT (3d ed., Lexis 
Publishing 2000) [hereinafter LARSON & LARSON, CASES, MATERIALS AND TEXT]. 
6. Richard A. Epstein, The Historical Origins and Economic Structure of Work­
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people were considered fortunate just to be employed. The risk of 
injury was part of the job, and there was no shortage of people will­
ing to take that risk.7 
The first reported employer liability cases - in England in 
18378 and in the United States in 18419 - ended in findings for the 
employers. However, even though it also found for the employer, 
Farwell v. Boston & Worcester Railroad lO set the stage for tort suits 
against employers when employees were injured, not due to their 
own misconduct, but because of some shortcoming in the way the 
employer conducted his business.l1 However, the ability to sue did 
not necessarily mean success. The common law defenses to negli­
gence of assumption of risk,12 contributory negligence,13 and the 
fellow-servant rule14 proved to be formidable obstacles rarely over­
ers' Compensation Law, 16 GA. L. REv. 775, 777 (1982) (explaining that the absence of 
pre-nineteenth century cases strongly suggests that "no employee could ever recover 
from any employer for any workplace accident"). 
7. Id. at 777-78. 
8. Priestley v. Fowler, 150 Eng. Rep. 1030 (Ex. 1837) (refusing to hold employer 
responsible for the negligence of an employee that caused injury to another employee). 
9. Murray v. South Carolina R.R, 26 S.C.L. (1 McMul.) 385 (1841) (rejecting 
plaintiff's claim against defendant railroad because the injury was caused by the negli­
gence of another employee, not the owner of the railroad himself). 
10. 45 Mass. (4 Met.) 49 (1842). 
11. Id. at 62. The employer was not found liable in this case because the miscon­
duct of the injured employee's co-worker actually caused the injury. However, the 
court left the door open for liability in cases of negligence by the employer. Id. "We are 
far from intending to say that there are no implied warranties and undertakings arising 
out of the relation of master and servant." Id. See Epstein, supra note 6, at 778-84 for a 
detailed discussion of Farwell. 
12. An assumption of risk defense claimed that the employee understood the 
risks inherent in the workplace and, in essence, released the employer from liability 
when the employee accepted the job. E.g., Fitzgerald v. Conn. River Paper Co., 29 N.E. 
464,465 (Mass. 1891) ("[A] servant assumes the obvious risks of the service into which 
he enters, even if the business be ever so dangerous ...."). This rule was softened in 
some jurisdictions when courts held that an employee could not assume the risk of an 
employer violating a safety statute. E.g., Narramore v. Cleveland, C., C. & St. L. Ry. 
Co., 96 F. 298,305 (6th Cir. 1899) (holding that where employer violated statue enacted 
for protection of employees, the employee who continued working with knowledge of 
the violation did not assume risk); Fitzwater v. Warren, 99 N.E. 1042, 1042 (N.Y. 1912) 
("[P]ubJic policy precludes an employee from assuming the risk created by a violation 
of the statute or waiving liability of the master for injuries caused thereby."). But see, 
e.g., Denver & RG.R Co. v. Norgate, 141 F. 247, 252-54 (8th Cir. 1905) (stating that a 
safety statute cannot repeal the common law defense of assumption of risk unless spe­
cifically stated in the statute). 
13. Contributory negligence rendered the plaintiff completely unable to recover if 
he was at least partially at fault for his injuries. See generally W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., 
PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 65, at 451-62 (5th ed. 1984). 
14. The fellow-servant rule was used to find against the plaintiff in Farwell and 
stood for the proposition that if another employee was at fault for the accident, the 
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come by injured employees.15 
The growth of industry in the late nineteenth century meant 
that workplaces became home to more machinery, which in turn 
became a breeding-ground for accidents. Indeed, during the time 
of the Industrial Revolution, the number of work-related injuries 
increased sharply.16 
However, the plight of the injured industrial worker did not go 
unnoticed. In 1884, Germany became the first country to enact 
workers' compensation lawsP Other industrialized countries soon 
followed suit. In the United States, New York enacted the first 
state workers' compensation laws in 1910.18 By 1963, all fifty states 
had adopted such acts.19 
Until 1917, legislatures feared that workers' compensation stat­
utes would be held unconstitutional on the grounds that their com­
pulsory and no-fault nature amounted to a taking of the employers' 
property without due process of law.20 Indeed, New York's system 
was held to violate the state constitution for that reason in 1911.21 
Because of this constitutional crisis, several states adopted "elec­
employer could not be held liable. See Farwell, 45 Mass. (4 Met.) at 62. Some jurisdic­
tions attempted to temper this rule in favor of the injured employee by creating exclu­
sions. See, e.g., N. Pac. RR v. Herbert, 116 U.S. 642, 647-48 (1886) (stating the "well 
settled" rule that it is the duty of the employer to provide safe working conditions and 
to hire competent people and that the delegation of these duties will not shield the 
employer from liability through the fellow-servant rule); Berea Stone Co. v. Kraft, 31 
Ohio St. 287, 292-93 (1877) (holding that the acts of a supervisor, even when "perform­
ing the duty of a common workman" will not exonerate the employer under the fellow­
servant rule). 
15. KEETON ET AL., supra note 13, § 80, at 569. See ARTHUR LARSON & LEX K. 
LARSON, LARSON'S WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW § 2.03 (2003) [hereinafter LARSON 
& LARSON, WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW]; Matthew B. Duckworth,S 1. SMALL & 
EMERGING Bus. L. 403, 406 (2001). 
16. LARSON & LARSON, WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW, supra note 15, at 
§ 2.07. 
17. KEETON ET AL., supra note 13, § 80, at 573 n.46. 
18. Maryland and Montana passed earlier, narrower acts in 1902 and 1909 respec­
tively, but they were short-lived. LARSON & LARSON, WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW, 
supra note 15, at § 2.07. 
19. Id. at § 2.08. 
20. Id. at § 2.07. Due process requires that a person charged with liability have 
the opportunity to refute the charges and have his defenses heard in a court of law 
before his property is taken. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The argument here was 
that since employers had to compensate accident victims virtually automatically, they 
were not given that opportunity. See Ives v. S. Buffalo RR, 94 N.E. 431 (N.Y. 1911). 
21. Ives, 94 N.E. at 431. New York amended its constitution to allow for compul­
sory workers' compensation systems and soon after enacted another statute. LARSON & 
LARSON, WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW, supra note 15 at § 2.07. 
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tive" statutes, which allowed employers to opt-out of the system.22 
By opting-out, an employer could be sued by an injured employee 
and could not assert the usual common law defenses.23 In 1917, 
however, a trio of Supreme Court cases firmly established the con­
stitutionality of compulsory workers' compensation systems.24 
Since then, the states have adopted varied statutes, creating a 
patchwork of benefits, requirements, and exceptions.25 In 1972, the 
National Commission on State Workmen's Compensation Laws 
presented its report, which recommended standards for state pro­
grams.26 The commission recommended federalization of these 
standards with sanctions for states that did not comply by 1975,27 
but no such federal legislation has been adopted, "in part because 
no device could be invented that would be both effective and politi­
callyacceptable."28 Nonetheless, many states have used these stan­
dards as benchmarks, perhaps to stave off the threatened 
federalization.29 
In addition to suggesting standards for state programs, the re­
port acknowledged common purposes served by the workers' com­
pensation system. It listed four major objectives for modern 
programs: "Broad coverage of employees and of work-related inju­
ries and diseases," "[s]ubstantial protection against interruption of 
income," "[p]rovision of sufficient medical care and rehabilitation 
22. LARSON & LARSON, WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW, supra note 15, at 
§ 2.07. 
23. Id. Only New Jersey and Texas continue to operate under an elective system 
today. STATISTICS AND RESEARCH CENTER, U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, 2003 
ANALYSIS OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAWS 10-13 (2003). 
24. Mountain Timber Co. v. State of Washington, 243 U.S. 219 (1917); Hawkins v. 
Bleakly, 243 U.S. 210 (1917); N.Y. Central R.R. Co. v. White, 243 U.S. 188 (1917). It is 
beyond the scope of this Note to examine the intricate constitutional arguments sur­
rounding these cases; suffice it to say that it is well established that compulsory workers' 
compensation systems are constitutional, and the system is flourishing today. LARSON 
& LARSON, CASES, MATERIALS, AND TEXT, supra note 5, at 24. 
25. See generally STATISTICS AND RESEARCH CENTER, supra note 23 (charts com­
paring state workers' compensation programs throughout pUblication). 
26. THE REpORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON STATE WORKMEN'S COM. 
PENSATION LAWS, Washington, D.C., July 1972. This commission was established by the 
Occupational Safety and Health Act, 84 Stat. 1616 (1970) (codified at 29 U.S.c.A. 
§ 676 (West 2003) but omitted from the United States Code). The commission ceased 
to exist ninety days after the final report was transmitted to the President and Congress. 
29 U.S.C.A. § 676 (West 2003). 
27. THE REpORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON STATE WORKMEN'S COM­
PENSATION LAWS, supra note 26, at 26. 
28. LARSON & LARSON, WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW, supra note 15, at § 2.08 
(2003). 
29. Id. 
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services," and "[e]ncouragement of safety."3o The report also rec­
ognized that "an effective system for delivery of the benefits and 
services" was essential to attain these objectives.31 
Today, workers' compensation is firmly embedded in this coun­
try's social, industrial, and statutory framework. While differing 
somewhat in scope and detail, every state provides this protection 
for injured workers and their employers.32 Even with these dispari­
ties, state programs can be generalized according to what injuries 
are covered, how benefits are calculated, and whether damage suits 
may be brought. Nevertheless, workers' compensation as a whole 
remains a mongrel, leading to confusion when compared to tort and 
social insurance.33 This next section will attempt to alleviate that 
confusion. 
B. 	 What is Workers' Compensation? Distinguishing Tort and 
Social Insurance 
Workers' compensation plans are extremely difficult to catego­
rize. Workers' compensation is not a system for tort recovery, and 
it is not "social insurance." Instead, it embodies many of the fea­
tures of both but also differs in very important ways.34 This section 
will compare and contrast workers' compensation with tort actions 
and social insurance. 
1. 	 Distinguishing Workers' Compensation from Tort 
Recovery 
While workers' compensation seeks to compensate personal 
injuries like tort actions, the system does not carry with it a fault 
component.35 Indeed, even a very clumsy or careless employee 
30. THE REpORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON STATE WORKMEN'S COM· 
PENSATION LAWS, supra note 26, at IS. 
31. 	 Id. 
32. 	 STATISTICS AND RESEARCH CENTER, supra note 23, at 15-23. 
33. "Almost every major error that can be observed in the development of com­
pensation law ... can be traced to the importation of tort ideas, or ... to the assumption 
that the right to compensation resembles the right to the proceeds of a personal insur­
ance policy." LARSON & LARSON, WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW, supra note 15, at 
§ 1.02. 
34. 	 Id. 
35. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.045 (2002) ("Compensation is payable irre­
spective of fault as a cause for the injury."); ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-9-401 (2002) 
("Every employer should secure compensation to its employees and payor provide 
compensation for their disability or death from compensable injury arising out of and in 
the course of employment without regard to fault as a cause of the injury."); D.C. CODE 
ANN. § 32-1503 (1998) ("Every employer subject to this chapter shall be liable for com­
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may recover when he is injured while working for the most careful 
and non-negligent employer.36 However, this should not be con­
fused with pure strict liability.37 The crucial but subtle difference is 
an added requirement of a "work connection" for workers' com­
pensation eligibility.38 Additionally, typical defenses to strict liabil­
ity, such as acts of God and acts of third persons, are not available 
in workers' compensation.39 
In another important contrast to tort, workers' compensation 
bases its awards only on injuries that diminish an employee's earn­
ing capacity. In this way, the compensation does not attempt to 
restore the injured worker to the position he would have been in 
had the injury not occurred, as it does in tort recoveries. Instead, 
the system establishes an amount that will ensure the employee will 
not become a burden to society.40 Payments are based solely on a 
pensation for injury or death without regard to fault as a cause of the injury or death."); 
IDAHO CODE § 72-201 (1999) ("[S]ure and certain relief for injured workmen and their 
families and dependents is hereby provided regardless of questions of fault."); MONT. 
CODE ANN. § 39-71-105 (2003) ("It is an objective of the Montana workers' compensa­
tion system to provide, without regard to fault, wage supplement and medical benefits 
to a worker suffering from a work-related injury or disease."); TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. 
§ 406.031 (1996) ("An insurance carrier is liable for compensation for an employee's 
injury without regard to fault or negligence ...."). 
36. LARSON & LARSON, CASES, MATERIALS AND TEXT, supra note 5, at 4-5. Cf 
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 23-4-2 (2002) (denying compensation where injury was self-in­
flicted or caused by employee's intoxication). 
37. Keeton defines strict liability as "liability that is imposed on an actor apart 
from either (1) an intent to interfere with a legally protected interest without a justifica­
tion for doing so, or (2) a breach of duty to exercise reasonable care." KEETON ET AL., 
supra note 13, § 75, at 534. While this is also true of employers' liability in workers' 
compensation, Keeton points out that there is a subtle distinction, calling it a "form of 
strict liability." Employers are not responsible for all injuries to employees, but only 
those that are work-related. Id. at 573. 
38. LARSON & LARSON, WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW, supra note 15, at 
§ 1.03[i]. See, e.g., OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 4123.01 (2003) (defining injury as "any 
injury ... received in the course of, and arising out of, the injured employee's employ­
ment"); TENN. CODE. ANN. § 50-6-102 (2003) (covering only injuries that are "arising 
out of and in the course of employment"); TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 406.031 (1996) 
(limiting coverage to those injuries that "arise[] out of and in the course and scope of 
employment"). 
39. LARSON & LARSON, WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW, supra note 15, at 
§ 1.03[3]. E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 23-901 (1995) (covering injuries "caused by the wil­
ful act of a third person directed against an employee because of the employee's em­
ployment"); GA. CODE ANN. § 34-9-1 (1998) (exempting only those willful acts of third 
persons that are personal in nature, as opposed to associated with employment). But see 
TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 406.032 (2003) (no liability for injuries that "arose out of an 
act of God, unless the employment exposes the employee to a greater risk of injury 
from an act of God than ordinarily applies to the general public"). 
40. LARSON & LARSON, WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW, supra note 15, at 
§ 1.03[5]. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-105 (2003) ("Wage-loss benefits are not 
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percentage of the employee's pre-injury wages, making the amount 
not completely arbitrary, but with some basis in the employee's for­
mer economic position.41 However, in keeping with the goal of 
merely protecting the injured employee from destitution, payments 
are often capped at the average wage for all workers in the area.42 
Pain and suffering is not considered in benefit calculation, nor are 
injuries that do not impact earning potentia1.43 Personal expenses 
not directly related to the health of the employee are likewise not 
covered.44 
Also, the employee does not "own" the unpaid balance in an 
award to be paid in installments.45 It cannot be devised or assigned, 
nor can it be attached for obligations like child support or ali­
mony.46 An injured employee's heirs have no claim on any unpaid 
benefits when the employee dies before receiving the fixed number 
of payments for his injury.47 The rationale for this lies in the theory 
that workers' compensation benefits are provided to replace the 
employee's lost earning capacity and to ensure that he or she is not 
intended to make an injured worker whole; they are intended to assist a worker at a 
reasonable cost to the employer."). 
41. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-105 (2003) (stating that "wage-loss bene­
fit should bear a reasonable relationship to actual wages lost as a result of a work­
related injury or disease"). 
42. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 25-5-68 (2003) (maximum weekly benefit $220.00 or 
100% of the average weekly wage for the state); GA. CODE. ANN. § 34-9-261 (1998) 
(temporary total disability payments are two-thirds of the employee's average weekly 
wage with a minimum of $42.50 and a maximum of $425.00). 
43. LARSON & LARSON, WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW, supra note 15, at 
§ 1.03[4]. E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 23-1044 (1995) (determining amount of benefits 
based solely on diminished capacity to do work); ARK. CODE. ANN. § 11-9-522 (2002) 
("The guide shall not include pain as a basis for impairment."). For example, a woman 
whose only injury is that she can no longer bear children will not be able to recover 
under the typical workers' compensation systems because this injury does not impact 
the ability to work or earning capacity. 
44. See, e.g., Kerr v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 529 A.2d 62, 63 (Pa. 
1987) (disallowing $18,303.89 of personal losses incurred while awaiting adjudication of 
workers' compensation award). 
45. LARSON & LARSON, WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW, supra note 15, at 
§ 1.03[6]. 
46. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-1068 (1995) ("[C]ompensation is ex­
empt from attachment, garnishment and execution and does not pass to another person 
by operation of law."); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-42-124 (2003) ("[C]laims for com­
pensation or benefits ... shall not be assigned, released, or commuted ... and shall be 
exempt from all claims of creditors ...."). 
47. LARSON & LARSON, WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW, supra note 15, at 
§ 89.03. But see ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-1068 (1995) (allowing for any unpaid ben­
efits that remain at death to be paid to the employee's personal representative). 
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subject to poverty.48 Once the employee dies, there exists neither a 
need to supplement his or her earnings nor a danger of the em­
ployee becoming a burden to society. Most statutes do provide that 
the injured employee's dependents will continue to receive benefits 
upon his or her death.49 However, these payments end when the 
dependents die or reach majority and no longer rely on the em­
ployee's earning potential for surviva1.50 
Finally, workers' compensation is not designed to punish the 
employer who is liable.51 Fault is not determined, so there is no 
"wrong" behavior to deter or correct through punishment.52 The 
compensation paid to the injured employee is not supposed to 
"hurt" the employer.53 In economic theory, the cost of compensat­
ing workplace accidents should fall to consumers through increased 
prices required to pay for employers' workers' compensation 
insurance.54 
Workers' compensation differs greatly from tort remedies. 
Workers' compensation requires no finding of fault, establishes 
benefits based on the worker's former income - rather than actual 
loss due to the injury - and does not act to punish the employer. 
Indeed, such characterization could lead to a belief that workers' 
compensation is a form of social welfare. The next section attempts 
to dispel that belief. 55 
2. 	 Distinguishing Workers' Compensation from Social 
Insurance 
Even though workers' compensation is very similar to social 
insurance programs like welfare, workers' compensation may be 
readily distinguished because payments are not based on actual 
48. LARSON & LARSON, WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW, supra note 15, at 
§ 89.03. See supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
49. LARSON & LARSON, WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW, supra note 15, at 
§ 1.03[6]. 
50. See Belcher v. Vulcan Materials Co., 359 So. 2d 383, 385 (Ala. Civ. App. 1978) 
(widow not entitled to receive dependant benefits after she remarried and her children 
reached 18 years of age), cert. denied, 359 So.2d 386 (Ala. 1978). 
51. 	 See supra note 35 and accompanying text. 
52. 	 Id. 
53. LARSON & LARSON, WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW, supra note 15, at 
§ 1.03[7]. 
54. 	 Id. 
55. KEETON ET AL., supra note 13, § 80, at 568 (stating that workers' compensa­
tion statutes "do not rest upon any theory of tort liability, but upon one of social 
insurance"). 
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need.56 Rather, the benefits are a "compromise between actual loss 
of earning capacity and arbitrary presumptions of the amount 
needed for support."57 Compensation schedules in workers' com­
pensation statutes base benefits on a percentage of current wages 
and impose an upper limit for benefits to be paid over a maximum 
number of weeks.58 These schedules do not take into account cir­
cumstances such as marital status, number of children, or current 
monetary obligations.59 
Additionally, benefits are not paid from state treasuries, so the 
cost of the program is not borne by the public at large. Employers 
either pay the benefits directly or they take part in insurance plans 
that will cover payouts. In either case, the cost is passed on to the 
consumers of the employer's products.6o Thus, consumers of prod­
ucts made in industries or by employers particularly prone to indus­
trial accidents will pay proportionately more than consumers of 
products made in inherently safer industries.61 Nonetheless, the 
cost of workers' compensation is not being paid by taxes levied 
56. LARSON & LARSON, WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW, supra note 15, at 
§ 1.04[3]. But see KEETON ET AL., supra note 13, § 80, at 568. 
57. LARSON & LARSON, WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW, supra note 15, at 
§ 1.04[3]. 
58. Id. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-307 (2003) (total incapacity weekly 
compensation equal to seventy-five percent of employee's average weekly earnings, for 
the "period of total incapacity"); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 152, § 34 (2003) (total 
incapacity weekly compensation equal to sixty percent of the employee's average 
weekly wage before the injury, not to exceed 156 weeks); NEB. REv. STAT. 48-121 
(2003) (partial disability compensation equal to "sixty-six and two-thirds percent of the 
difference between the wages received at the time of the injury and the earning power 
of the employee thereafter," not to exceed 300 weeks); S.c. CODE ANN. § 42-9-10 
(2003) (total disability weekly compensation equal to sixty-six and two-thirds percent of 
employee's average weekly wages, not to exceed 500 weeks). Many statutes also list 
specific compensation levels for the loss of certain body parts, usually paid in addition 
to temporary partial disability compensation. See, e.g., ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 23­
1044 (1995) (for loss of hearing in one ear, fifty-five percent of average monthly wage 
for twenty months; for loss of hearing in both ears, fifty-five percent of average monthly 
wage for sixty months); NEB. REV. STAT. 48-121 (2003) (for thumb, sixty-six and two­
thirds percent of daily wages for sixty weeks; for great toe, sixty-six and two-thirds of 
daily wages for thirty weeks); TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-6-207 (2003) (for loss of eye, 
sixty-six and two thirds percent of average weekly wage for one hundred weeks; for loss 
of eye and arm, sixty-six and two thirds percent of average weekly wage for 350 weeks). 
59. LARSON & LARSON, WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW, supra note 15, at 
§ 1.04[3]. But see MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 152, § 35A (2003) (allowing for additional 
payments of six dollars per week for each dependant, provided that the total payment 
does not exceed the average weekly wage of the employee or one hundred fifty dollars, 
whichever is smaller). 
60. LARSON & LARSON, WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW, supra note 15, at 
§ 1.04[2]. 
61. Id. 
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against all citizens of a state; it is a cost of doing business. This 
feature of workers' compensation represents a stark contrast to so­
cial insurance. 
C. Exclusivity of Remedy 
For injured employees covered by a state's workers' compensa­
tion act, benefits under the act are the sole available remedy.62 
Even if the employee does not choose to claim benefits, he is still 
precluded by statute from filing suit against the employer.63 In al­
most every case, a covered employee is barred from bringing both 
common law tort and statutory claims against an employer.64 Even 
statutes particularly targeting worker protection, such as the federal 
Occupational Safety and Health Act65 and the federal Migrant and 
Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act,66 will not give rise to 
a private action if the implicated injury is covered by a state's work­
ers' compensation act.67 
The converse of the exclusivity principle is also true: an em­
ployer may be liable for injuries that are not covered by the act. 
This seems only logical since the rationale behind exclusivity is that 
the employee is guaranteed benefits in return for the forfeiture of 
the right to sue.68 Therefore, if the employee is not entitled to ben­
62. Id. at § 100.01[1]. See, e.g., In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation, 
818 F.2d 210 (2d Cir. 1987); Kinchloe v. Aero Commander, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 32, 37 
(W.D. Pa. 1974), affd, 511 F.2d 1394 (3d Cir. 1975); Henderson v. State, 715 P.2d 978, 
979 (Idaho 1986); Lindsay v. Crohan, 508 A.2d 674 (R.1. 1986). 
63. LARSON & LARSON, WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW, supra note 15, at 
§ 100.01[4). See, e.g., Shelby v. Truck & Bus Group Div. of General Motors Corp., 533 
N.E.2d 1296 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989); Holody v. City of Detroit, 323 N.W.2d 599 (Mich. Ct. 
App.1982). 
64. LARSON & LARSON, WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW, supra note 15, at 
§ 100.03[1). The exception to this is federal and state anti-discrimination laws. See, e.g., 
Roberts v. Roadway Express, Inc., 149 F.3d 1098, 1105 (10th Cir. 1998) (concerning 
TItle VII); Karcher v. Emerson Elec. Co., 94 F.3d 502 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding workers' 
compensation barred common law tort suit, but not suit for emotional damages result­
ing for discrimination in violation of Missouri Human Rights Act). 
65. 29 U.S.C. § 653(b)(4) (2003) ("Nothing in this Act shall be construed to su­
persede or in any manner affect any workmen's compensation law ...."). 
66. 29 U.S.c. § 1854(d)(I) (2003) ("[W]here a State workers' compensation law is 
applicable and coverage is provided for a migrant or seasonal agricultural worker, the 
workers' compensation benefits shall be the exclusive remedy for loss of such worker 
under this Act in the case of bodily injury or death ...."). 
67. The exclusivity provision in the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker 
Protection Act was added after the Supreme Court ruled that the Act, before the 
amendment, showed no congressional intent to limit its coverage for injuries covered by 
workers' compensation. See Adams Fruit Co., Inc. v. Barrett, 494 U.S. 638 (1990). 
68. LARSON & LARSON, WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW, supra note 15, at 
§ 100.Q1. 
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efits because the injury is not covered by the act, he or she should 
not be required to give up that right.69 Many examples of this type 
of situation exist, and most involve injuries that occurred at work 
but not in the course of employment.7o 
However, a critical distinction must be made from those cases 
where the injury is technically covered by the statute, but because 
of the injury's nature, no benefits are payable. In these cases, the 
undoubtedly work-related injury does not impair the employee's 
earning capacity.71 Since the goal of workers' compensation is to 
ensure that the injured employee can still provide adequately for 
his or her livelihood, there is no need to compensate these injuries. 
The statute does cover these injuries; the injured employee may not 
bring tort claims against the employer.72 
Additionally, the exclusivity rule will bar common-law suits 
where the statute of limitations has run,73 or a statutory require­
ment has not been met.74 For example, in the Anaconda Case,15 a 
miner attempted to secure benefits under the Occupational Disease 
69. "[R]ights of action for damages should not be deemed taken away except 
when something of value has been put in its place." Id. at § 100.04. See also Potts v. 
UAP-GA. AG. Chern., Inc., 506 S.E.2d 101, 103 (Ga. 1998) (finding that employee's 
action in tort was not precluded because Georgia's act provided no coverage for injuries 
resulting from employer's fraudulent statements to doctors about employee's exposure 
to chemicals); Smothers v. Gresham Transfer, Inc., 23 P.3d 333, 361-63 (Or. 2001) (hold­
ing that where benefits were denied because plaintiff failed to prove his work-related 
exposure to chemicals was the "major contributing cause" of his injury, plaintiff entitled 
to bring suit under Oregon's Remedies Clause guaranteeing citizens a right to redress 
for injuries). 
70. See, e.g., Skinner v. Ogallala Pub. Sch. Dist. No.1, 631 N.W.2d 510 (Neb. 
2001) (finding that teacher could bring personal injury suit for injury occurring when 
she came back to school at night with her husband, a band director, to return borrowed 
computer equipment because it was a personal, not work-related visit); McBride v. Her­
shey Chocolate Corp., 188 A.2d 775 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1963) (holding that exclusivity did 
not bar suit against employer for failing to control co-employee who assaulted plaintiff; 
conflict between employees was personal and therefore the injury did not arise in the 
course of employment). 
71. The most common examples of this are found in cases where reproductive 
organs have been injured. See, e.g., Hyett v. Northwestern Hosp. for Women & Chil­
dren, 180 N.W. 552 (Minn. 1920) (finding that employee's work related injury to pubic 
nerve, rendering him impotent, did not entitle him to compensation). But see Spyhalsky 
v. Cross Constr., 743 N.Y.S.2d 212 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002) (stating that, while tort action 
was barred, payments of medical expenses for artificial insemination of wife were 
granted). See also supra note 43 and accompanying text. 
72. LARSON & LARSON, WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW, supra note 15, at 
§ 100.05[1]. 
73. See Kane v. Durotest Corp., 182 A.2d 559 (N.J. 1962). 
74. Weldon v. Celotex Corp., 695 F.2d 67 (3d Cir. 1982). 
75. Anaconda Co. v. Dist. Ct. of Second Judicial Dist., In and For County of Sil­
ver Bow, 506 P.2d 81 (Mont. 1973). 
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Act relating to his contraction of silicosis. The Act, however, re­
quired that an employee be exposed to silicon for a minimum of 
1,000 shifts to be eligible for benefits.76 The miner was denied ben­
efits and was also barred from a tort claim because his injury was 
technically covered by the Act.77 
D. Issues of Conflicts of Law and Eligibility 
When an employee qualifies for benefits under a workers' 
compensation statute, the benefits are paid either by the employer 
directly or by the employer's insurer.78 When more than one state 
has an interest in the injury, the question arises: which state's stat­
ute will apply?79 A discussion of the resolution of such conflicts of 
law is beyond the scope of this Note. 
However, two important points must be made here. First, re­
gardless of what state's law applies to the determination of benefits 
for the injured employee, the employer must pay those benefits, ei­
ther directly or through its insurance.8o The state itself does not pay 
the benefits out of its general funds. The question of which state's 
law applies does not alter who pays the benefits. 
Second, state laws vary in their requirements for applicability, 
but they all require some kind of connection to the state at the time 
of the injury.81 In general, a question only arises when the em­
ployee is injured while working in another state since the injury it­
self is typically enough of a connection to trigger the applicability of 
76. Id. at 84. 
77. Id. at 85. This case was overturned by Gidley v. W.R. Grace & Co., 717 P.2d 
21,22-23 (1986) (interpreting the Montana statute stating that there is "no common-law 
right of action for occupational disease against an employer ... excepting for those 
employees not eligible for compensation under ... this act" to mean that employees 
whose injuries did not meet the requirements were able to sue). 
78. Some states allow employers to choose between self and commercial insur­
ance, while others require employers to carry commercial insurance. STATISTICS AND 
REsEARCH CENTER, supra note 23, at 10-13. Ohio and North Dakota maintain a state 
run fund for workers' compensation benefits, funded by the employers in the state. Id. 
79. A complicated example is the situation in Daniels v. Trailer Transp. Co., 42 
N.W.2d 828 (Mich. 1950). The employee in that case lived in Illinois and made a con­
tract for employment in Texas with a company based in Michigan. The company had 
operations in various states, and the employee traveled extensively in his work. He was 
injured in Tennessee. The court held that even though the employee signed a contract 
stating that Michigan's workers' compensation law would apply, Michigan's statute was 
not applicable. Id. at 830. 
80. Cf STATISTICS AND RESEARCH CENTER, supra note 23, at 10-13 (indicating 
that all states provide for penalties for failure to insure). 
81. LARSON & LARSON, WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW, supra note 15, at 
§ 101.04[3]. 
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the statute.82 The common threads of the applicability require­
ments center on the place of employment, the place of the em­
ployer's headquarters, and the place where the employment 
contract was made.83 Less often, a state will consider the residence 
of the employee.84 
From these principles, it is clear that when an employee travels 
to another state to work for his employer, coverage by some state 
statute travels with him or her, either by virtue of the statute in the 
employer's home state, or because the statute in the state of injury 
will apply to any injury that occurs within its borders. The question 
posed in this Note is: what happens when an employee moves after 
they are injured? Clearly, the statute that applied to them at the 
time of injury will still govern their benefits.85 But is it permissible 
for a state to declare that it will no longer require the employer to 
pay benefits to the employee, once they have left the state? To 
answer this question, this Note will first explore the history and de­
velopment of the constitutionally guaranteed right to travel among 
the states. 
II. HISTORY AND DEFINITION OF THE RIGHT TO TRAVEL 
The idea that citizens of the United States have a fundamental 
right to travel originated in the Articles of Confederation,86 and the 
particulars of the scope and constitutional source of this right have 
82. Id. at § 101.05[3]. 
83. Id.; STATISTICS AND RESEARCH CENTER, supra note 23, at 8. The Alaska 
statute offers a clear example of extraterritorial coverage provisions: 
(a) If an employee, while working outside the territorial limits of this state, 
suffers an injury on account of which the employee, or in the event of the 
employee's death, the employee's dependents, would have been entitled to the 
benefits provided by this chapter had the injury occurred in this state, the em­
ployee or, in the event of the employee's death resulting from the injury, the 
employee's dependents shall be entitled to the benefits provided by this chap­
ter, if at the time of the injury (1) the employee's employment is principally 
localized in this state; (2) the employee is working under a contract of hire 
made in this state in employment not principally localized in any state; (3) the 
employee is working under a contract of hire made in this state in employment 
principally localized in another state whose workers' compensation law is not 
applicable to the employee's employer; or (4) the employee is working under a 
contract of hire made in this state for employment outside the United States 
and Canada. 
ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.011 (2002) (emphasis added). 
84. LARSON & LARSON, WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW, supra note 15, at 
§ 101.04[2]. 
85. See supra note 81 and accompanying text. 
86. See infra note 114. 
276 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 27:261 
been the source of debate ever since.87 Part IIA discusses how the 
Supreme Court first recognized and justified the right to travel as a 
component of the Commerce Clause. Next, Part lIB looks at more 
recent developments in the right to travel based on the Equal Pro­
tection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. This part will high­
light three important "right to travel" cases, Shapiro v. 
Thompson,88 Dunn v. Blumstein,89 and Memorial Hospital v. Mari­
copa County,90 in which the Court established and clarified the 
right of a newly arrived state citizen to be treated in the same man­
ner as long-time residents. Part II.C examines Saenz v. Roe,91 the 
most recent Supreme Court "right to travel" decision. This section 
centers on the Court's shift in emphasis to the Privileges and Immu­
nities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and on the establish­
ment of three "components" of the right to travel. 
A. Early Development Through the Commerce Clause 
While the Constitution does not articulate a specific "right to 
travel," judicial discussions of such a right can be found as early as 
1823 in Corfield v. Coryeli,92 a decision by a Pennsylvania federal 
court regarding a New Jersey statute disallowing the taking of oys­
ters by non-residents. The court upheld the statute as constitu­
tional, and Justice Washington, in his opinion, enumerated a 
number of rights the court thought to be "fundamental. "93 The list 
included "[t]he right of a citizen of one state to pass through, or to 
reside in any other state, for purposes of trade, agriculture, profes­
sional pursuits, or otherwise."94 
The Supreme Court's first mention of the fundamental nature 
of moving from one state to another came in an 1849 dissent by 
87. For example, Chief Justice Rehnquist expressed his disagreement with the 
Court's articulation of the scope of the right to travel in his dissent in Saenz v. Roe. 
Compare Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 514-16 (1999) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) with 
discussion infra Part II.C. 
88. 394 U.S. 618 (1969). 
89. 405 U.S. 330 (1972). 
90. 415 U.S. 250 (1974). 
91. 526 U.S. 489 (1999). 
92. 6 F. Cas. 546 (E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230). 
93. Justice Washington defined the "privileges and immunities of citizens in the 
several states" as those that are "in their nature, fundamental." Id. at 551. 
94. Id. at 552. Other rights articulated were "[p]rotection by the government," 
"life and liberty," "to acquire and possess property," "to pursue and obtain happiness," 
"to claim the benefit of the writ of habeas corpus," "the right to bring suit in state 
courts," and "the elective franchise." Id. at 551-52. 
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Chief Justice Taney.95 In the Passenger Cases, the Court consoli­
dated two cases, Smith v. Turner and Norris v. City of Boston, 
which challenged fees paid by vessel masters for every passenger 
brought into the New York and Boston ports, respectively.96 The 
Court did not rest its opinion on the right to travel, but instead 
struck down the fees as unconstitutional restrictions on interstate 
commerce.97 However, both the majority and the dissent recog­
nized the fundamental nature of the ability to move among the 
states in the union without impediment.98 
Two decades later, in 1867, the Court used infringement on the 
right to travel as grounds for finding a state law unconstitutional in 
Crandall v. Nevada. 99 The statute in question required a fee from 
any passengers leaving the state of Nevada,lOo the opposite of the 
fee requirement in the Passenger Cases. The Court made clear its 
belief that a nation made up of many states, but with one central 
seat of government, could not function if states were free to place 
restrictions or taxes on citizens crossing state borders to reach the 
place of government.IOl The Court declined to follow the lower 
court's lead and decide the case based on either the Commerce 
Clause, which forbids the states from regulating interstate com­
merce, or the clause that prohibits states from laying duties on im­
ports or exports.102 Instead, the Court rested its decision solely on 
the right to travel and fully embraced Chief Justice Taney's words in 
the Passenger Cases .103 The Court cited the Crandall holding in 
95. The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 492 (1849) (Taney, c.J., 
dissenting). 
96. /d. at 392-93, 409. 
97. Id. at 409-10. The Supreme Court has inferred from the constitutional grant 
of power to regulate interstate commerce to Congress that states may not enact laws 
that place an undue burden on interstate commerce. See U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, d. 3; 
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 199-200 (1824) ("[W]hen a State proceeds to 
regulate commerce with foreign nations, or among the several States, it is exercising the 
very power that is granted to Congress, and is doing the very thing which Congress is 
authorized to do."). See generally IRWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCI· 
PLES AND POLICIES 401-34 (Aspen Publishers 1997). 
98. The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 492 (Taney, c.J., dissenting) ("We 
are all citizens of the United States ... [and] must have the right to pass and repass 
through every part of it without interruption, as freely as in our own States."). 
99. 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35,43-50 (1867) (holding as unconstitutional a fee levied on 
all passengers leaving Nevada). 
100. Id. at 36. 
101. Id. at 43-44. See also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, d. 1 ("The Congress shall have 
Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, ... but all Duties, Imposts 
and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States."). 
102. Crandall, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) at 43. 
103. Id. at 48-49. See supra note 98. 
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subsequent cases, and the fundamental right to travel was born.104 
While the Court has never denied the existence of the right to 
travel,105 it has struggled to give the right a constitutional 
"home."106 At first, the Court grounded the right on the Com­
merce Clause, which prohibits states from regulating or interfering 
with interstate commerce.107 In Edwards v. California, the Court 
held unconstitutional a state statute making it a misdemeanor to 
bring an "indigent" into the state of California. lOS It reasoned that 
the movement of persons across state lines was a component of in­
terstate commerce, and thus any restriction on that movement by a 
state was an impermissible regulation.109 
The Court again addressed the right to travel in terms of the 
104. Attorney Gen. of New York v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898, 902 (1986); Dunn 
v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 338 (1972); United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757-58 
(1966); Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 294 n.10 (1964); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 
126 (1958); Ex parte Mitsuye Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 308 (1944); Edwards v. California, 314 
U.S. 160, 178-79 (1941) (Douglas, J., concurring); Hague v. Comm. For Indus. Org., 307 
U.S. 496, 520-21 n.1 (1939); Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U.S. 404, 430 (1935); Twining v. New 
Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 97 (1908); Williams v. Fears, 179 U.S. 270, 274 (1900); The Slaugh­
ter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 79-80 (1873). 
105. No reported cases show disagreement with the general principle of the right 
to travel as a fundamental right. Gregory B. Hartch, Comment, Wrong Turns: A Cri­
tique of the Supreme Court's Right to Travel Cases, 21 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 457, 458 
(1995). 
106. For a thorough examination of the constitutional source of the right to 
travel, see Lonnie Shirl Thrner, The Right to Travel and the Problem of Unenumerated 
Constitutional Rights (1972) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, 
Los Angeles, on file with the Western New England College School of Law Library). 
Thrner concludes that there are several sources, and "each protects travel in a different 
way and to a different degree." Id. at ix. Thrner further explains that establishing the 
source of this unenumerated right will help to define the scope of the right and better 
protect it from future judicial challenges. Id. at 5-8. See also Karin Fromson Segall, 
Note, Federal Courts: It's Not Black and White: Spencer v. Casavilla and the Use of the 
Right of Intrastate Travel in Section 1985(3), 57 BROOKLYN L. REV. 473, 480-95 (1991). 
107. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. See supra note 97 and accompanying text. 
108. Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 177 (1941). 
109. Id. at 172. Although the decision was unanimous, only five justices joined 
the majority opinion grounding the right to travel in the Commerce Clause. Three of 
the other justices believed that the right of citizens to travel should have "a more pro­
tected position" than the movement of goods. Id. at 177 (Douglas, J., concurring, joined 
by Black, J., and Murphy, J.). They asserted that the right to travel is a national right of 
itself and should have its own protection apart from any clause of the Constitution. Id. 
at 181. Justice Jackson, in his lone concurrence, rested the right to travel on the Privi­
leges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 182-83 (Jackson, J., 
concurring). See ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., THREE HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE CONSTITU­
TION OF 1787, at 189-93 (University of Kansas Press 1956) for a thorough discussion of 
these different opinions. See infra notes 139-41 and accompanying text for a discussion 
of the Privileges and Immunities Clause. 
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Commerce Clause in United States v. Guest.110 This time, instead of 
examining a statute that was alleged to infringe on that right, the 
Court upheld an indictment against individuals who were charged 
with "conspir[ing] to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any cit­
izen in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege se­
cured to him by the Constitution ... of the United States."l11 One 
of the counts in the indictment was for depriving black citizens of 
"[t]he right to travel freely to and from the State of Georgia."112 
The lower court found the indictment did not charge an offense 
under the law,113 presumably on the belief that the Constitution did 
not secure the right to travel in and out of the state. In upholding 
the indictment, the Court strongly reaffirmed the notion of a funda­
mental right to travel but stopped short of establishing its Constitu­
tional source.114 
B. A Change of Focus: Equal Protection 
A trio of cases in the late 1960s and early 1970s signaled a shift 
in the focus of the right to travel from mere border crossings to how 
a citizen exercising that right would be treated upon arrival in the 
new state. Shapiro v. Thompson,115 Dunn v. Blumstein,116 and Me­
morial Hospital v. Maricopa County117 all involved state statutes 
110. 383 U.S. 745 (1966). 
111. [d. at 747 (quoting 18 U.S.c. § 241 (1964». 
112. Id. at 748. 
113. [d. at 747-48. 
114. Id. at 758-59. This Court mentioned the thorny issue that the Articles of 
Confederation specifically provided that "the people of each State shall have free in­
gress and regress to and from any other State," but this statement was not included in 
the Constitution. [d. at 758; ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IV. The attorney for 
New York in The Passenger Cases made this point, arguing that power over ingress and 
egress must have initially rested with the States, since the Articles purported to limit it. 
The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 356 (1849). The Constitution's omission of 
this limitation, he claimed, must have been a conscious reallocation back to the States. 
Id. The Court in Guest speculated that the drafters of the Constitution believed the 
right to travel "so elementary" to a union of states that it did not merit specific mention. 
Guest, 383 U.S. at 758. For an argument that the framers of the Constitution could not 
have meant to exclude this right but instead believed it was "already embodied else­
where and left it out as superfluous," see CHAFEE, supra note 109, at 184-87. 
115. 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (invalidating Connecticut, Pennsylvania, and District of 
Columbia statutes requiring one-year state residency for receiving welfare benefits), 
overruled in part on other grounds by Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974). 
116. 405 U.S. 330 (1972) (invalidating a Tennessee statute requiring one-year 
state residency to vote in state elections). 
117. 415 U.S. 250 (1974) (invalidating an Arizona statute requiring one-year 
county residency for indigents to be eligible for free non-emergency care at that 
county's hospital). 
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requmng minimum residency periods before new citizens could 
take advantage of certain benefits or privileges. Shapiro set out the 
test to be used by later durational residency cases, and Dunn and 
Maricopa clarified and narrowed the scope of the right to travel. 
Shapiro consolidated challenges to three statutes that required 
twelve months of consecutive residency for welfare benefits eligibil­
ity.118 In its analysis, the Court admitted that the challenged wait­
ing-periods fulfilled the legislative intent "to preserve the fiscal 
integrity of state public assistance programs" inasmuch as the state 
would not be required to serve a large "influx of indigent newcom­
ers."119 However, the Court stated that "inhibiting migration by 
needy persons into the State is constitutionally impermissible" and 
grounded this in the right to travel.120 
The Court could have stopped with this holding and with its 
invocation of United States v. Jackson: "If a law has 'no other pur­
pose ... than to chill the assertion of constitutional rights by penal­
izing those who choose to exercise them, then it [is] patently 
unconstitutional.' "121 
118. Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 621-22. The Connecticut Welfare Department, by stat­
ute, denied Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) benefits to a 19-year-old 
single mother because she had not yet lived in Connecticut for a full year. Id. at 622-23. 
The challenge to the District of Columbia statute involved three citizens denied AFDC 
benefits and one citizen denied Aid to the Permanently and Totally Disabled benefits. 
The denials were based on a statute that required one full year of residency prior to 
applying for benefits. Id. at 623-25. The third challenge involved two Pennsylvania re­
sidents denied AFDC benefits because they had not been residents for at least one 
year. Id. at 625-26. In the Connecticut and Pennsylvania cases, the lower courts held 
the statutes to violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. 
at 623, 626. The District Court for the District of Columbia used the Due Process 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment to hold the statute unconstitutional. Id. at 625. 
119. Id. at 627-28. The Court quoted sponsors and defenders of the statutes to 
show that the underlying intent was to avoid attracting indigents. Id. For example, the 
sponsor of the Connecticut statute said during debate: "I doubt that Connecticut can 
and should continue to allow unlimited migration into the state on the basis of offering 
instant money and permanent income to all who can make their way to the state regard­
less of their ability to contribute to the economy." Id. at 629 (quoting H. B. 82, Con­
necticut General Assembly House Proceedings, February Special Session, 1965, Vol. II, 
pt. 7, p. 3504). 
120. Id. at 629-31. The Court stated it had no reason to establish the constitu­
tional source of the right to interstate travel. Id. at 630 ("We have no occasion to 
ascribe the source of this right to travel interstate to a particular constitutional provi­
sion."). Instead, it relied on the previous assertion by the Court in Guest that the right 
to travel is "a right so elementary" that it does not need a specific mention in the Con­
stitution. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757-58 (1966). 
121. Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 631 (quoting United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 581 
(1968», overruled by Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 687 (1991) on the ground that 
the 11th Amendment forbids court-ordered retroactive payments. 
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However, the Court went on to apply the test established in 
Skinner v. Oklahoma 122 to determine constitutionality under the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,123 Under 
that test, also known as "strict scrutiny review," "any classification 
which serves to penalize the exercise of [a constitutional] right, un­
less shown to be necessary to promote a compelling governmental 
interest, is unconstitutional."124 Pennsylvania and the District of 
Columbia contended that the waiting period served the compelling 
government interests of better welfare budget planning, supplying 
an objective test for bona fide residency, minimizing fraud, and en­
couraging new residents to enter the work force quickly.125 The 
Court examined these governmental ends and quickly discounted 
them as not "compelling." Indeed, because minimum residency re­
quirements were not even rationally related to a legitimate end ­
the "traditional equal protection [test]" used for classifications that 
do not infringe on a fundamental right _126 the Court held that the 
classification could not satisfy the more rigorous strict scrutiny re­
view, and the statutes had to be struck down.127 
Shortly after Shapiro, additional residency requirement cases 
gave the Court an opportunity to clarify its position on right to 
travel cases. Dunn, in invalidating a one-year residency prerequi­
site to voting, added that actual intention to deter interstate travel 
was not required to trigger the compelling state interest test,128 As 
long as the statute in some way penalized the exercise of the right 
to travel, the constitutional right was abridged.129 
Dunn also clarified that the first step in the evaluation of such 
a statute was to look at the nature of the classification and the na­
ture of the affected individual interests to determine whether either 
was fundamental,130 The Court stated that if either the right upon 
which the classification was based - in this case, the right to vote ­
122. 316 U.S. 535 (1942). See also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 97, at 532-33. 
123. Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 634. 
124. Id. 
125. Id. 
126. Id. at 638. See, e.g., U.S. Dept. of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973); 
McGowen v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420,425-26 (1961) ("[T]he Fourteenth Amendment 
permits the State a wide scope of discretion in enacting laws which affect some groups 
of citizens differently than others. The constitutional safeguard is offended only if the 
classification rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State's objec­
tive."); Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78-79 (1911). 
127. Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 638. 
128. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 339-40 (1972). 
129. Id. 
130. Id. at 335. This was not a pivotal issue in this case since the Court could find 
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or the interest affected - the right to travel - was fundamental, the 
compelling state interest test would be used.131 In this case, a one­
year residency requirement not only infringed on the right to travel, 
but also on the right to vote, so strict scrutiny was clearly the cor­
rect standard to applyPZ 
Memorial Hospital explained that the Court was looking for 
the denial of a "vital" benefit when determining if the right to travel 
had been implicated.133 It noted with approval lower court rulings 
that upheld state statutes requiring one-year residency to obtain in­
state tuition discounts at state funded colleges.134 A college educa­
tion, while important, was not a "basic necessity of life."13s 
After Shapiro, Dunn, and Memorial Hospital, the courts were 
left with a relatively simple Equal Protection analysis for right to 
travel cases. If a statute or state regulation was based on a classifi­
cation that penalized the exercise of the right to travel by denying a 
basic necessity of life, a court was to evaluate it using strict scrutiny 
review.136 If the classification was not necessary to accomplish a 
compelling state interest, then the statute would be struck down.137 
However, this clarity ended with Saenz v. Roe.B8 
little argument that the rights to vote and to travel were anything but fundamental 
rights. [d. 
131. "[W]hether we look to the benefit withheld by the classification (the oppor­
tunity to vote) or the basis for the classification (recent interstate travel) we conclude 
that [the compelling state interest test must used)." [d. However, Memorial Hospital 
later stated that "[t]he amount of impact required to give rise to the compelling-state­
interest test was not made clear" in Shapiro [and Dunn]. Mem'l Hosp. v. Maricopa 
County, 415 U.S. 250, 256-57 (1974). 
132. Dunn, 405 U.S. at 335. 
133. Mem'l Hasp., 415 U.S. at 258-60. The Court compared the denial of "basic 
[necessities] of life," which had been struck down, with residency requirements for 
lower in-state tuition, which had not. From this comparison, the Court determined that 
the "necessity" of the benefit being denied was important, even though it did not draw a 
bright line: "Whatever the ultimate parameters of the Shapiro penalty analysis, it is at 
least clear that medical care is as much 'a basic necessity of life' to an indigent as wel­
fare assistance." [d. at 259. 
134. [d. at 260 n.15. See Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 452-53 (1973) ("Nor 
should our decision be construed to deny a State the right to impose on a student, as 
one element in demonstrating bona fide residence, a reasonable durational residency 
requirement ...."). 
135. Mem'l Hosp., 415 U.S. at 260 n.15. 
136. [d. at 258-60. 
137. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 97, at 767. 
138. 526 U.S. 489 (1999). 
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C. 	 Finding the Right to Travel in the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause 
Before Saenz, it would have been safe to say that whenever a 
statute penalized someone for exercising his or her right to travel 
by moving to a new state by denying a fundamental right or basic 
necessity of life, the compelling state interest test would be used.139 
However, Saenz cast doubt on this simple summary. Instead of de­
nying welfare benefits to new residents, as in Shapiro, the Califor­
nia statute in Saenz limited welfare payments to new residents to 
the amount they had received in their former state.140 The Court 
began its analysis by again looking for the constitutional source of 
the right to travel.141 It identified three "components" of the right 
to travel: the right to move between the states, the right to not be 
treated as an "unfriendly alien" when temporarily in another state, 
and the right to be treated in the same way as long-time citizens of a 
state when one permanently settles there.142 
Since the first component was not at issue, the Court declined 
to attempt to find its source.143 However, the Court did not hesi­
tate in pinpointing Constitutional protection for the second compo­
nent, even though this component, again, was not at issue in the 
case. The Court said the right could be found in the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause of Article IV, which guarantees that non-re­
sidents will not be discriminated against solely because they are re­
sidents of other states. l44 
In establishing a constitutional home for the third component, 
which this case clearly implicated, the Court took a different, per­
139. A number of other cases implicated the right to travel in the ensuing years as 
well. See, e.g., Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263 (1993); 
Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1 (1992); Attorney Gen. of New York v. Soto-Lopez, 476 
U.S. 898 (1986); Hooper v. Bernalillo County Assessor, 472 U.S. 612 (1985); Martinez v. 
Bynum, 461 U.S. 321 (1983); Califano v. Torres, 435 U.S. 1 (1978). For purposes of this 
Note, it is not necessary to go into detail about these cases. 
140. Saenz, 526 U.S. at 492. For example, if a family that received $225 per 
month in welfare benefits in Alabama moved to California, they could only receive a 
maximum of $225 from California for the first year of their residency, even if they 
qualified for a much higher amount under the California system. 
141. Id. at 500. 
142. Id. 
143. Id. at 501. However, the Court did go on to endorse the view that the right 
to travel from one state to another was "conceived from the beginning to be a necessary 
concomitant of the stronger Union the Constitution created." Id. (quoting United 
States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 758 (1966». See supra note 98 and accompanying text. 
144. 	 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2; Saenz, 526 U.S. at 501-02. 
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haps surprising,145 tack. Instead of using the Equal Protection 
Clause as it had in Shaprio and its progeny,146 it grounded its deci­
sion on the Privileges and Immunities Clause found in the Four­
teenth Amendment. The Court explained that this clause gives 
United States citizens the right to reside in any state and to have 
the same rights and benefits of any other citizen in that state.147 
Thus, the Court found that newly arrived citizens in California must 
be given the same opportunity for, and amount of, welfare as any 
other current resident.148 
After Saenz, determining whether an enactment penalized the 
right to travel seemed simple. If an enactment infringed on one of 
the three components, then it was a penalty149 and should be re­
viewed using strict scrutiny.150 However, these components do not 
address non-residency based benefits administered through state 
statutes, such as workers' compensation. 
III. STATEMENT OF THE CASES 
Three state workers' compensation statutes have been chal­
lenged on the grounds that they unconstitutionally impinge on the 
right to travel. Only two cases, Fisher v. Reiser151 and McEnerney 
v. United States Surgical Corp., 152 were decided in a federal court 
based on the U.S. Constitution.153 Part lILA discusses the first 
145. For arguments that the Privileges and Immunities Clause is not an appropri­
ate application for the right to travel, see Calvert Chipchase, Saenz v. Roe: The Right to 
Travel, Durational Residency Requirements, and a Misapplication of the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause, 23 U. HAW. L. REv. 685 (2001); Dan Wolff, Right Road, Wrong 
Vehicle?: Rethinking Thirty Years of the Right to Travel Doctrine: Saenz v. Roe, 119 S. 
Ct. 1518 (1999), 25 U. DAYTON L. REv. 307 (2000). 
146. Saenz, 526 U.S. at 502-04. 
147. Id. at 503-04. "The States ... do not have any right to select their citizens." 
!d. at 511. 
148. Id. at 507. 
149. Id. at 505 ("But since the right to travel embraces the citizen's right to be 
treated equally in her new State of residence, the discriminatory classification is itself a 
penalty."). 
150. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969). 
151. 610 F.2d 629 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 930 (1980). 
152. 805 A.2d 816 (Conn. App. Ct. 2002). 
153. The state case was Alaska Pacific Assurance Co. v. Brown, 687 P.2d 264 
(Alaska 1984). The Alaska court struck down a provision of the Alaska Workers' Com­
pensation program that significantly decreased benefits to injured employees who 
moved outside of Alaska as being contrary to the Alaska state constitution. Id. at 269. 
The court held that the right to travel was part of the Alaska constitution, and this right 
was implicated by the statutory scheme. Id. at 271. With a fundamental interest im­
pinged, the court applied Alaska's equal protection analysis. In that analysis, the level 
of justification the state must show is in direct proportion to the extent of the infringe­
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case, Fisher, which was decided before Saenz. Fisher upheld a Ne­
vada cost of living increase to workers' compensation benefits given 
only to recipients residing in Nevada.154 Part lILA also describes 
the dissent of that opinion where Judge Hufstedler of the Ninth 
Circuit argued that denying a cost of living increase for workers' 
compensation to non-residents was indeed a penalty on those who 
exercised their right to travel. She asserted that this case could fit 
into the Shapiro Equal Protection model. Part III.B discusses 
McEnerney v. United States Surgical Corp., the most recent work­
ers' compensation case to rely on right to travel jurisprudence. In 
this case, the Connecticut Appellate Court upheld a provision in 
the Connecticut Workers' Compensation Act that denies additional 
partial disability benefits to injured employees no longer willing 
and able to work within Connecticut. 
A. 	 Fisher v. Reiser: Allowing Different Compensation For Out­
of-State Recipients 
1. The Majority Opinion 
In Fisher v. Reiser, Nevada's cost-of-living increases in work­
ers' compensation benefits were challenged as unconstitutional be­
cause they were given only to those injured employees and their 
survivors who continued to reside in Nevada.155 The state's work­
ers' compensation program covered employees who were working 
ment on the right. Id. at 273-74. In this application, the court found that the statute 
"impose[d] a substantial penalty upon the exercise by [workers' compensation recipi­
ents] of the right to travel out of Alaska" because the reduction in benefits far exceeded 
any change in cost-of-living a recipient might encounter by moving to another state. Id. 
at 273. Thus, the state's burden of justification was high, and the court held this was not 
met. Id. at 274. If the state was indeed trying to ensure that workers moving out of 
state to convalesce did not obtain a windfall and therefore have an incentive to remain 
out of work, this objective could have easily been met without impinging on the right to 
travel by tying benefit amounts to cost-of-living levels in the recipient's new state of 
residence. Id. at 274. 
154. 	 Fisher, 610 F.2d at 637: 
155. Id. at 631. While this case was decided before Saenz, the outcome likely 
would have been the same. Using the Saenz analysis, the court probably would have 
chosen the Privileges and Immunities analysis since there was no indication Fisher was 
physically stopped from moving to another state. See supra notes 144-50 and accompa­
nying text. Fisher's situation was most like that in the third component of the right to 
travel; however, because new residents of Nevada were not being treated differently 
than old residents, the court most likely would have decided that the third component 
of the right to travel was not implicated in the statute. Following that conclusion, the 
court would have used the rational basis review, the lowest form of scrutiny, just as it 
did, and would have come to the same result. 
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in Nevada for a covered employer at the time of their injury.156 
Workers who were permanently and totally disabled could receive 
two-thirds of their "average wage" at the time of their injury, until 
their death, and death benefits were available to the surviving 
spouse until their death or remarriage.157 In 1973 and 1975, the 
Nevada legislature recognized the steep inflation rate was severely 
impacting recipients and enacted cost-of-living increases totaling 
twenty percent. However, only those recipients who remained re­
sidents of Nevada could receive the increases. l58 
The facts of this case focus on Gladys Fisher. Her husband was 
injured while working in a Las Vegas metal shop in 1962, and he 
began receiving total disability payments.159 The couple moved to 
California in 1963 so their children could assist in the care of Mr. 
Fisher, and when he died in 1972, Mrs. Fisher remained in Califor­
nia.160 Mrs. Fisher requested the cost-of-living increase when en­
acted in 1973, and she was told that, unless she moved back to 
Nevada, she would continue to receive only $167.50 per month ­
the same amount she and her husband had been receiving since 
1962.161 
The Ninth Circuit held that the right to travel was not penal­
ized, and therefore strict scrutiny review of the statute was not war­
ranted.162 The court found three fatal distinctions between this case 
and the three right to travel cases cited by Fisher for support.163 
First, the majority contrasted the state's obligation to immediately 
grant new residents the same benefits enjoyed by long-time re­
sidents with the continuing obligation of a state to a former resi­
dent.164 The court found no support for the proposition that a 
former state of residence must include former residents in programs 
established to assist current residents.165 Indeed, the court held 
156. Fisher, 610 F.2d at 631. Employees working temporarily outside of the state 
were also covered provided they had been hired or regularly employed in Nevada, and 
employees hired outside of Nevada were covered as long as they were not working in 
Nevada only temporarily and thus covered by another state's program. Id. (citing NEV. 
REV. STAT. § 616.520, 616.260 (1979)). 
157. Id. 
158. Id. at 631-32. 
159. Id. at 632. 
160. Id. 
161. Id. at 633. 
162. Id. 
163. Those cases were Mem'l Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974), 
Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972), and Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). 
164. Fisher, 610 F.2d at 633-34. 
165. Id. at 634. 
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that only the state in which a person currently resides has the means 
and the obligation to provide for the well being of a resident.166 
Second, the court stated that the right to travel would only be 
implicated where there was a "durational aspect" in the statute.167 
States have an unfettered right to offer certain benefits only to their 
citizens, and the Supreme Court had, at this point, only struck down 
requirements that a new resident live in the state for a specified 
time.168 The court noted that it upheld "bare residency require­
ments," such as residency as a condition for municipal 
employment.169 
Third, the majority stated that an important factor in right to 
travel cases is whether the benefit being denied is of a "fundamen­
tal character," like non-emergency medical care, the right to vote, 
and subsistence welfare benefits.170 It decided that since Fisher's 
benefits were only "supplemental payment[ s] for spousal disabil­
ity," not based on "financial need," the court would not elevate 
them to the same "urgency" as welfare or medical care. l71 
Since the right to travel was not implicated, the court applied 
the equal protection rationality test. l72 The cost-of-living increases 
were paid out of Nevada's general treasury instead of the workers' 
compensation insurance fund, and, therefore, the court found that 
Nevada could legitimately "confin[e] payments to those most likely 
to spend [them] within ... the state."173 The classification of re­
sidents versus non-residents was rationally related to this end be­
cause the legislature could use many factors to support this 
conclusion, such as the cost to administer the program to out-of­
state residents and a better understanding of the needs of in-state 
residents as opposed to out-of-state residents.174 
166. Id. at 633. 
167. Id. at 635. 
168. Id. 
169. Id. (citing McCarthy v. Phila. Civil Servo Comm'n, 424 U.S. 645 (1976». 
170. Id. The benefits noted are from Mem'l Hosp. V. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 
250 (1974), Dunn V. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972), and Shapiro V. Thompson, 394 U.S. 
618 (1969), respectively. 
171. Fisher, 610 F.2d at 636. The court cited Mathews V. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 
340-43 (1976), for the holding that benefits not based on financial need will not bring 
into question the same constitutional issues that withholding basic subsistence benefits 
will. 
172. Fisher, 610 F.2d at 636. Where two classes similarly situated are treated dif­
ferently, but no fundamental right is implicated, the court will uphold the statute in 
question so long as it is rationally related to a legitimate end. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 
97, at 764. 
173. Fisher, 610 F.2d at 637. 
174. Id. The court did not say if there was any evidence that the legislature actu­
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2. The Dissent 
Judge Hufstedler began her dissent by stating that workers' 
compensation benefits are not the same as welfare and should not 
be treated as such when considering constitutional issues surround­
ing eligibility requirements.175 Throughout her opinion, she reiter­
ated that the very nature of workers' compensation is to 
compensate a worker for past injury, not simply to provide for the 
general welfare of a person in need.176 
Judge Hufstedler took on the three flaws that the majority ad­
dressed. While she agreed that a person's current state of residence 
is in the best and most appropriate position to provide for his or her 
general welfare, she said that this situation was "emphatically not 
the case before this court."177 In the case of workers' compensa­
tion, historically, the state in which the resident worked when in­
jured had the responsibility of making such a provision, as it relates 
to the injury occurring within the state.178 Therefore, the person's 
"present connection" with a particular state is not important when 
considering eligibility; the "past connection" of being injured while 
working in the state triggers benefits. Because of this, Judge Huf­
stedler argued, a requirement that the recipient also have a "pre­
sent connection" restricts the right to travel by forcing the injured 
worker to stay in the state to receive his or her full 
compensation.179 
Judge Hufstedler also refuted the majority's characterization of 
this issue as one not involving a durational aspect.180 She again re­
ferred to the two connections the Nevada statute required: a "past 
connection" (working or residing in Nevada at the time of injury in 
order to become initially eligible) and a "present connection" (cur­
rent residency in Nevada to receive the cost-of-living increase).181 
She pointed out that this was no different than the requirement in 
ally used these factors to support its decision to pass this statute. However, the possible 
reasons the court put forth do not have to be the actual reasons for the legislation; all 
that is required in the lowest level of scrutiny is that the court can conceive a rational 
justification. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 97, at 764. 
175. Fisher, 610 F.2d at 637 (Hufstedler, J., dissenting). 
176. "Disability and death benefit pensions are designed to compensate injured 
workers and their survivors for their loss of earning power caused by industrial inju­




180. Id. at 640. 
181. Id. at 641. 
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Shapiro that a welfare recipient have been a resident of California 
at two distinct points in time: at the time of application and twelve 
months prior.182 
Finally, Judge Hufstedler asserted that the cost-of-living in­
creases were most certainly of a "fundamental nature," and the de­
nial of them resulted in a "significant penalty ... on the exercise of 
the right to travel."183 The Fishers relied upon the workers' com­
pensation payments in obtaining the basics of day-to-day living, and 
the denial of the cost-of-living expenses in the face of steep infla­
tion would clearly cause severe hardship.l84 
Since Judge Hufstedler firmly believed that the denial of the 
cost-of-living increase was indeed a penalty on the exercise of the 
right to travel - no different than in Shapiro, Maricopa, and Dunn 
- she urged that the court strike down the statute unless it was 
proved "necessary to promote a compelling governmental inter­
est."185 Judge Hufstedler quickly concluded that Nevada's stated 
interest - to make life better for some of its citizens for as little cost 
as possible - was hardly compelling, and therefore the statute 
should fail. 186 
B. McEnerney v. United States Surgical Corp.187 
Carol McEnerney was injured on the job in 1994, and she re­
ceived partial disability benefits until their expiration on January 
31, 1997.188 She then became eligible for forty-six weeks of addi­
tional benefits pursuant to Connecticut's General Statutes § 31­
308a189 and began receiving $271.05 per week.190 McEnerney relo­
182. Id. at 640. 
183. Id. at 642. 
184. Id. 
185. Id. (quoting Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969». 
186. Id. 
187. McEnerney v. United States Surgical Corp., 805 A.2d 816 (Conn. App. Ct. 
2002). 
188. Id. at 819. 
189. This statute states in pertinent part: 
(a) In addition to the compensation benefits provided by section 31-308 for 
specific loss of a member or use of the function of a member of the body, or 
any personal injury covered by this chapter, the commissioner, after such pay­
ments provided by said section 31-308 have been paid for the period set forth 
in said section, may award additional compensation benefits for such partial 
permanent disability equal to seventy-five per cent of the difference between 
the wages currently earned by an employee in a position comparable to the 
position held by such injured employee prior to his injury, [less applicable 
taxes and insurance], and the weekly amount which such employee will proba­
bly be able to earn thereafter, [less applicable taxes and insurance]. ... The 
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cated to Florida so she could live with her son in a better climate, 
and Connecticut terminated the additional payments, even though 
she was eligible to collect payments for 15.72 more weeks.191 She 
appealed to the commissioner and the workers' compensation 
board, but both found that she was ineligible for continued pay­
ments because she was no longer "willing and able to perform 
work" in Connecticut, as required by the statute.192 
In its evaluation of McEnerney's constitutional argument,193 
the court first questioned whether the statute imposed a penalty on 
those workers' compensation recipients who leave Connecticut to 
reside in another state.194 After acknowledging the long history of 
the right to travel, the court cited the three components of the right 
enumerated in Saenz .195 Then, without explanation, it settled on a 
definition of the right to travel that limits application to "how a 
citizen is treated in her new state of residence."196 
The court then asserted that the Supreme Court had already 
decided this issue in Califano v. Torres .197 In Torres, a Connecticut 
resident was denied his Supplemental Security Income benefits af­
ter he moved to Puerto Rico.198 The Court held that the right to 
travel doctrine did not "require[ ] that a person who travels to Pu­
erto Rico must be given benefits superior to those enjoyed by other 
residents of Puerto Rico if the newcomer enjoyed those benefits in 
the State from which he came."199 Further, the doctrine would not 
"require a State to continue to pay those benefits indefinitely to any 
persons who had once resided there. "200 The Connecticut court 
duration of such additional compensation shall be determined upon a similar 
basis by the commissioner, but in no event shall the duration of such addi­
tional compensation exceed the lesser of (1) the duration of the employee's 
permanent partial disability benefits, or (2) five hundred twenty weeks. Addi­
tional benefits provided under this section shall be available only to employees 
who are willing and able to perform work in this state. 
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-308a (2003). 
190. McEnerney, 805 A.2d at 819. 
191. Id. 
192. Id. 
193. McEnerney's complaint also argued that the statute was not applied cor­
rectly, prompting the court to first interpret "willing and able to perform work in this 
state." Id. at 820-21. The court found that, based on the language of the statute, the 
commissioner was justified in terminating the benefits. Id. 
194. Id. at 822. 
195. See supra text accompanying note 142. 
196. McEnerney, 805 A.2d at 822. 
197. Id. (citing Califano v. Torres, 435 U.S. 1 (1978». 
198. Torres, 435 U.S. at 2-3. 
199. Id. at 4. 
200. Id. 
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construed the Torres decision as holding that the right to travel 
never entitled a benefit recipient to continue receiving those bene­
fits from the former state of residence.201 Since McEnerney's case 
represented exactly that situation, the court held that her right to 
travel was not implicated, and therefore, Connecticut did not need 
to demonstrate a compelling state interest.202 
McEnerney exemplifies rigid application of the Saenz compo­
nents.203 In this case, a clear penalty on the right to travel did not 
fit into one of those components. In the next section, this Note will 
argue that the application of the right to travel doctrine to workers' 
compensation, as seen in Fisher and McEnerney, is flawed. It will 
further argue that the three components in Saenz unnecessarilyex­
clude protections for citizens leaving former states of residence. 
Part IV goes on to suggest an alternate approach to issues involving 
the right to travel. 
IV. ANALYSIS 
A. Issue Not Decided by Califano v. Torres 
McEnerney relied heavily on Torres for its proposition that for­
mer states of residence can never be required to continue to pro­
vide benefits for residents who have moved,204 but Torres did not 
decide the exact issue presented. 
Torres can be distinguished on several different levels. First, 
Torres involved a benefit recipient who left the United States in­
stead of moving to another state.205 The Court clearly stated that 
the right to international travel was not fundamental, but instead 
was "no more than an aspect of the 'liberty' protected by the Due 
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment," which could be burdened 
to an extent.206 The right to interstate travel has been designated as 
fundamental and can be traced to an early recognition that travel 
among the United States was necessary to encourage growth and 
trade within the country and to allow citizens of all states to take 
part in the centralized government, no matter where it was 
located.207 
201. McEnerney, 805 A.2d at 822. 
202. [d. at 823. The court did not discuss the rational basis test because neither 
party included that analysis in its brief. [d. at 823 n.9. 
203. See supra note 142 and accompanying text. 
204. McEnerney, 805 A.2d at 822-23. 
205. Torres, 435 U.S. at 2. 
206. [d. at 4 n.6. 
207. Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35,43-44 (1867). 
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Second, the benefit at issue in Torres was Supplemental Secur­
ity Income ("SSI"), a federal program benefit that was not available 
to persons residing outside of the United States.20B Unlike workers' 
compensation, SSI required need and specific residency as initial 
prerequisites.209 To permit Torres to take her United States SSI 
benefits with her to Puerto Rico would allow her to reap a benefit 
unavailable to other residents of Puerto Rico. The Court hinted in 
dicta that the same proposition would apply to the states.210 
Indeed, this makes sense for programs like welfare and special 
education.211 Allowing a former resident of one state - California, 
for example - to continue to receive welfare benefits from that 
state after moving to another state - like Wyoming - would give 
that person an advantage over other residents of Wyoming. While 
long-time residents of Wyoming would only have the benefit of Wy­
oming's welfare program, the new resident could decide which pro­
gram would be most beneficial to him. 
Also, in this example, California would not have an interest in 
funding the livelihood of a resident of Wyoming, and it is far more 
appropriate for a person's home state to evaluate the needs of that 
person.212 This argument, that the former state has no interest in 
the citizen after he leaves and has no obligation to determine the 
citizen's need, is made in Fisher.213 While this argument is clearly 
applicable to welfare and similar social assistance benefits, the fol­
lowing discussion will show why it cannot apply to workers' 
compensation. 
The Supreme Court in Torres left the door open for cases 
where it might be appropriate to allow someone to take his benefits 
with him when he moves to another state.214 Workers' compensa­
tion should be one of those cases because initial eligibility is not 
based on residence; it is based on injury.215 So, continuing with the 
example above, if a worker is injured in California and moves to 
Wyoming, he would not be getting any special advantages over 
other residents of Wyoming because the means of comparison 
208. Torres, 435 U.S. at 2. 
209. Id. See supra Part I.B.2. 
210. Torres, 435 U.S. at 4. 
211. Cf Michael C. v. Radnor Township Sch. Dist., 202 F.3d 642 (3d Cir. 2000). 
212. See Fisher v. Reiser, 610 F.2d 629, 633 (9th Cir. 1979). 
213. Id. at 633. 
214. Torres, 435 U.S. at 5 ("If there ever could be a case where a person who has 
moved from one State to another might be entitled to invoke the law of the State from 
which he came as a corollary of his constitutional right to travel, this is surely not it. "). 
215. See supra Part I.D. 
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would necessarily be different. The real question would be whether 
he was getting benefits superior to other people injured while work­
ing in California, since eligibility is not based on where one lives, 
but instead on where one is injured.216 Conversely, taking away 
that worker's benefits solely because he left California would put all 
those who were injured in California and stayed there in a much 
better position, and only because they did not elect to exercise their 
right of travel. Such a result is a classic example of a state action 
that would be found unconstitutional under Equal Protection. 
Additionally, the level of benefits provided through workers' 
compensation is not based on the individual's need; it is based on 
arbitrary amounts and time limits established by statute.217 Since 
there is no need for any state - the former state or the current state 
of residence - to determine the needs of the recipient, the argument 
that the current state of residence is in a better position to make 
that determination falls short of proving anything. 
Third, Torres dealt with a program funded by public federal 
funds. In the case of workers' compensation, it is not the state itself 
providing the benefits; instead it is the employer, either directly or 
through its insurer. In the absence of insurers - and in many states, 
large employers may qualify to be self-insured - the employers di­
rectly pay for medical expenses and the allowable benefits. Once 
again, the argument that it is more appropriate for a state to care 
for its own fails because the state is not providing the funding for 
the benefits. Employers pay into workers' compensation funds or 
to their insurers based on the risk that one of their employees will 
be injured, regardless of where those employees reside.218 
B. "Three Components" Aren't Enough 
The recent right to travel jurisprudence does not give enough 
weight to the "first component" of travel that ensures free move­
ment among the states. Indeed, the Saenz Court did a disservice to 
the right to travel by splitting it into three components.219 This at­
tempt at a bright line division has led to some confusion220 and to a 
216. See supra note 81 and accompanying text. 
217. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text. 
218. See supra Part I.D. 
219. Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 500 (1999). See also supra note 142 and accom­
panying text. 
220. See Wolff, supra note 145, at 330 ("However, Saenz did not unify [the right 
to travel] cases under the Privileges or Immunities Clause. Quite to the contrary, the 
Court solidified the fractionalized right to travel by articulating the three components 
which make it up ...."). 
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gap - an important part of the right to travel is left unprotected by 
the three components. 
A situation could arise, as in McEnerney, where a citizen of 
one state wants to relocate permanently to another state, and is pe­
nalized, not by the new state, but by the former state.221 Yet, this 
situation would not be considered a "right to travel" issue under 
Saenz because it does not fit neatly into the three components.222 
While this situation should fit into the first component of the right 
to travel - the right to move between the states - the Saenz Court 
concluded that a state does not infringe on the first component un­
less it imposes a physical or administrative obstacle to interstate 
border crossings.223 This narrow interpretation appears to permit 
"moving fees" and other non-physical impediments imposed on citi­
zens wanting to leave a state - the very exactions that first impli­
cated the right to travel.224 Such a view is contrary to the whole 
history of the right to travel. Crandall v. Nevada invalidated inter­
state travel fees, a historical equivalent to taxing or denying bene­
fits to a citizen today who has decided to move to another state.225 
The view that imposing fees or denying benefits is not an obstacle 
to interstate movement226 does not consider economic realities. 
People on the economic edge depend on every dollar they have; a 
monetary penalty for exercising a right may prevent an indigent 
person from exercising that right.227 
Penalties for leaving a state could presumably fit into the third 
component - the right to be treated the same as other residents ­
but the Saenz Court chose to limit that component only to dispa­
22l. See Fisher v. Reiser, 610 F.2d 629 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 930 
(1980) (former state denying cost-of-living increases to recipients who have moved out 
of state); Alaska Pac. Assurance Co. v. Brown, 687 P.2d 264 (Alaska 1984) (former 
state significantly decreasing amount of benefits for those recipients who move to an­
other state); McEnerney v. United States Surgical Corp., 805 A.2d 816 (Conn. App. Ct. 
2002), cert. denied, 811 A.2d 1292 (Conn. 2002) (former state withholding benefits after 
recipient moves to another state). 
222. McEnerney, 805 A.2d at 822. 
223. Saenz, 526 U.S. at 500-0l. 
224. Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35, 43-49 (1867) (holding as unconstitu­
tional a fee levied on all passengers leaving Nevada). 
225. Id. at 36. 
226. Saenz, 526 U.S. at 501 ("Given that [restricting the amount of welfare bene­
fits a new resident may receive] imposed no obstacle to ... entry into California, we 
think ... that the statute does not directly impair the exercise of the right to interstate 
movement. "). 
227. Recall that actual deterrence is not necessary for a finding that the right to 
travel was infringed; the mere possibility that someone would be deterred is enough. 
See supra notes 128-29 and accompanying text. 
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rate treatment by the new state.228 This component ignores the 
possibility that a former state could penalize its citizens for moving 
away, effectively trapping them inside the state.229 The early cases 
outlawing fees for traveling to other states were not limited to fees 
imposed by the state entered;230 Crandall invalidated fees charged 
when a citizen left the state of Nevada.231 Whenever someone relo­
cates, two states are involved, and both are equally capable of pe­
nalizing the moving citizen for exercising that right.232 Regardless 
of which state imposes the penalty, a United States citizen is still 
penalized for exercising his or her right to move from one state to 
another. Whether the former state of residence imposes the pen­
alty on the way out or the new state of residence imposes one on 
the way in, the citizen still must pay for exercising his or her right. 
Coming or going, relocation is relocation.233 
The Saenz components are simply not broad enough to cover 
every type of burden on the right to travel. The Courts that articu­
lated this right did not intend for it to be so narrowly construed; 
they envisioned free unimpeded travel to and from states and relo­
cation at will.234 A penalty placed on citizens solely because they 
move to another state clearly obstructs that freedom.235 If the first 
component is limited only to actual movement across state lines, 
and the other two components only deal with how people are 
228. Saenz, 526 U.S. at 502 (defining the third component as "the right of the 
newly arrived citizen to the same privileges and immunities enjoyed by other citizens of 
the same State"). 
229. E.g., McEnerney v. United States Surgical Corp., 805 A.2d 816, 818-19 
(Conn. App. Ct. 2002), cert. denied, 811 A.2d 1292 (Conn. 2002). 
230. E.g., The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 492 (1849). 
231. Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35, 36 (1867). 
232. "[I]nterstate travel is not a one-way road." Fisher V. Reiser, 610 F.2d 629, 640 
(9th Cir. 1979) (Hufstedler, J., dissenting). 
233. The right at issue in the modern cases ... is not simply a right to travel to 
or through a state but rather a right to move there - the right ... to relocate 
.... To a large extent America was founded by persons escaping from envi­
ronments they found oppressive .... [A] dissenting member [of a community] 
... should have the option of exiting and relocating in a community whose 
values he or she finds more compatible. 
JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 178­
79 (1980). 
234. See Crandall, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) at 49 ("We are all citizens of the United 
States, and as members of the same community must have the right to pass and repass 
through every part of it without interruption, as freely as in our own States.") (quoting 
The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 492 (1849». See also United States v. 
Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 758 (1966). 
235. E.g., Crandall, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) at 43-50 (fee charged to leave the state of 
Nevada was an unconstitutional infringement on the right to travel). 
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treated by their host or new home state, what protects people from 
penalties imposed by the state they are trying to leave? 
While the Saenz components are convenient for identifying va­
rious Constitutional doctrines that might protect the right,236 the 
right should be viewed as more simple and broad, with the constitu­
tional basis varying according to the context.237 The situation in 
which the right is implicated, not the right itself, should determine 
what constitutional source provides the test to be used. Therefore, 
in a situation where visitors are being treated differently than re­
sidents, the Privileges and Immunities test should be used. Like­
wise, in situations where new residents are treated differently than 
long-time residents, an Equal Protection analysis would be 
appropriate.238 
Applying an Equal Protection analysis to the McEnerney situa­
tion, the court could have looked at whether a classification was 
used that implicated the right to travel, instead of declining to im­
plicate the right to travel because a new state was not penalizing a 
new resident.239 A classification that hinged on the exercise of the 
right to travel was clearly used - of the people injured while work­
ing in Connecticut and eligible for supplemental benefits, the class 
of recipients who moved and were no longer able to work in Con­
necticut were treated differently than those who did not move.240 
Since the exercise of a fundamental right, the right to travel, was 
the basis for the classification, "its constitutionality [should have 
been] judged by the stricter standard of whether it promotes a com­
pelling state interest. "241 This does not mean that the statute using 
the classification would be automatically unconstitutional; it simply 
means that the statute should have to pass a more rigorous test. 
C. A New Approach for Workers' Compensation Cases 
Since the Supreme Court has not ruled on the issue of restrict­
ing workers' compensation benefits based on residency, and be­
236. One scholar has questioned the necessity to establish a Constitutional 
source. See Turner, supra note 106 (asserting that a firm grounding in the Constitution 
gives legitimacy to the right to travel and arguing that the right has more than one 
source). 
237. Id. 
238. See Mem'l Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974); Dunn v. Blum­
stein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.~. 618 (1969). 
239. See supra note 196 and accompanying text. 
240. McEnerney v. United States Surgical Corp., 805 A.2d 816, 818-19 (Conn. 
App. Ct. 2002). 
241. Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 638. 
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cause it does not fit neatly into other prior decisions, a new 
approach must be considered. This approach should take into con­
sideration the unique characteristics of workers' compensation. 
First, courts must not view workers' compensation strictly as wel­
fare. In so doing, the Supreme Court must reconsider the scope of 
the Saenz components. Indeed, they were developed in a case con­
sidering welfare benefits - assistance granted by the state only to 
those in dire need. The components do not appear to contemplate 
benefits regulated by the state and paid for by private employers in 
return for a shield from liability.242 In the case of workers' compen­
sation, states are doing much more than providing for the needs of 
injured employees. The states are also protecting the interests of 
employers in the state by providing a more predictable and inex­
pensive means for compensating those employees who are injured 
on the job.243 
The more appropriate approach for workers' compensation 
statutes that treat non-residents differently than residents is a re­
turn to the Shapiro, Dunn, and Maricopa analysis.244 If a workers' 
compensation statute is based on a classification that penalizes the 
beneficiary's right to travel and to choose the state in which he or 
she resides, then the classification should be subject to strict scru­
tiny. Thus, unless the classification is necessary to achieve a com­
pelling state interest, it must fail. 
The fairness and flexibility of such an analysis can be seen by 
applying it to the two workers' compensation/right to travel cases 
discussed in this Note.245 First, the Nevada program in Fisher 
would most likely be upheld, but not for the reasons stated in the 
Ninth Circuit's opinion. Rather than attempt to exclude workers' 
242. See supra Part I.C. 
243. See supra Part I.B. 
244. See supra notes 136-37. 
245. An application of this approach to the Alaska case, decided under the 
Alaska Constitution and discussed supra note 153, is also illustrative. The Alaska stat­
ute, as written at the time of the Alaska Pacific Assurance case, would not, and did not 
survive the Equal Protection analysis used. However, the Alaska legislature modified 
the statute to still treat non-residents differently, but in a way that is less discriminatory 
than its predecessor. ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.175(b). The compelling state interest that 
Alaska promoted with this statute was encouraging workers to seek recovery from their 
injuries and return to employment. The concern was that if injured employees could 
take their Alaska benefits to other states with much lower costs-of-living, they would 
have no incentive to return to work. Instead of an arbitrary decrease in benefits, the 
new program decreases benefits only to the extent that the actual cost of living in the 
recipient's new state of residence is less than that of Alaska. As such, the decrease does 
not represent a penalty, since the injured employee will presumably have the same 
purchasing power, regardless of where he resides. 
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compensation from the right to travel doctrine because it is differ­
ent than welfare and other state provided services, the court could 
have simply applied the Equal Protection analysis to reach the same 
result. Because the Nevada state treasury was the source of the 
cost of living increases, Nevada had a compelling interest in provid­
ing additional support for its own citizens. A state should not be 
compelled to use its treasury to care for citizens of other states. 
Application of the Shapiro Equal Protection analysis to 
McEnerney, however, would yield a different result. The additional 
benefits denied to out-of-state residents were not paid by Connecti­
cut's state treasury - they were additional payments the employer 
had to provide. The state cannot claim an interest in caring for its 
own when it is not the entity providing the care. Additionally, if the 
stated reason for the provision is to lower costs of workers' com­
pensation insurance for employers, denying certain benefits to non­
residents is not the necessary, most non-discriminatory way to ac­
complish that goal. Reducing some benefits across the board would 
produce the same result, as would devising a more stringent review 
process to reduce fraud. 
CONCLUSION 
In short, an analysis that does not take into consideration the 
broad purposes of this country's workers' compensation system 
does a disservice to workers and creates a class of people - victims 
of industrial accidents - who are restricted in their exercise of a 
fundamental right. The fundamental right to travel freely among 
the states is firmly imbedded in this country's history and jurispru­
dence. Hence, McEnerney's interpretation of the current doctrine, 
which allows states to penalize workers' compensation recipients 
for moving to another state, is at odds both with the history of the 
right to travel and the purposes of the workers' compensation sys­
tem in the United States .. Using strict scrutiny review to evaluate 
workers' compensation provisions that treat injured employees who 
move to other states differently will protect the employees' right to 
relocate while permitting states to craft statutes that are fair to both 
employers and employees. 
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